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<title>Michel Benoit - Pensions &amp; Benefits Law</title>
<link>http://www.pensionsbenefitslaw.com/michel-benoit.html</link>
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<copyright>Copyright 2011</copyright>
<lastBuildDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:45:00 -0500</lastBuildDate>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:56:01 -0500</pubDate>
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<title>CAPSA Guidelines re Prudent Investments and Funding Policies</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The <a href="http://www.capsa-acor.org/">Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities</a> (CAPSA) has been working away at providing pension plan administrators with guidance regarding pension plan investing and funding. As we reported <a href="http://www.pensionsbenefitslaw.com/2011/03/articles/plan-administration/capsa-releases-draft-guidelines-on-prudence-standard-and-funding-policies/">earlier</a>, CAPSA released draft guidelines this past spring. Those guidelines were released on November 15, 2011 in final form: <a href="http://www.capsa-acor.org/en/init/prudence/Pension_Plan_Prudent_Investment_Practices_Guideline.pdf">Guideline No.6 &ndash; Pension Plan Prudent Investment Practices Guideline</a> (the Investment Guideline) and <a href="http://www.capsa-acor.org/en/init/prudence/Pension_Plan_Funding_Policy_Guideline.pdf">Guideline No.7 &ndash; Pension Plan Funding Policy Guideline </a>(the Funding Policy Guideline).</p>
<p>These guidelines are intended to build on the principles of pension plan governance established by <a href="http://www.capsa-acor.org/en/init/governance_guidelines/guideline_self-asses_questionnaire.pdf">CAPSA Guideline No.4 &ndash; Pension Plan Governance Guideline</a>.</p>]]><![CDATA[<p><strong>Pension Plan Prudent Investment Practices Guideline<br />
</strong></p>
<p>The Investment Guideline is designed to help administrators demonstrate the application of prudence to the investment of pension plan assets. It sets out a number of prudent investment principles including the Prudent Person Rule which it describes as &ldquo;a substantive rule of law that is intended to lead to balanced decision making, rather than dictate particular outcomes.&rdquo;</p>
<p>The Guideline emphasizes the importance of communications with plan members especially when they have responsibility for making investment decisions For example, members of capital accumulation plans (CAP) should be provided with sufficient details about plan investment options to enable them to make informed investment decisions. For more detailed guidance on plan communications, administrators of CAPs should also refer to <a href="http://www.capsa-acor.org/en/init/cap_accumulation/guideline number 3.pdf">Guideline No. 3 for Capital Accumulation Plans</a>.</p>
<p>In connection with the Investment Guideline, CAPSA has also developed a <a href="http://www.capsa-acor.org/en/init/prudence/Self_Assessment_Questionnaire_on_Prudent_Investment_Practices.pdf">Self-Assessment Questionnaire</a> for plan administrators. The Questionnaire asks plan administrators to review their plan&rsquo;s investment practices and consider a number of issues/activities when determining whether they are investing prudently, including:</p>
<ul>
    <li>The roles and responsibilities of the plan administrator, the plan sponsor and their delegates, including responsibility for establishing the investment policy.</li>
    <li>The plan&rsquo;s investment objectives, risks and corresponding risk management practices, and Statement of Investment Policies &amp; Procedures.</li>
    <li>The delegation of investment activities, and the parties responsible for continuing to monitor and review such activities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Pension Plan Funding Policy Guideline</strong></p>
<p>The Funding Policy Guideline provides guidance on the development and adoption of written funding policies for defined benefit pension plans. It provides a list of issues that a funding policy should address, including:&nbsp;</p>
<ul>
    <li>An overview of the plan&rsquo;s features.</li>
    <li>The plan&rsquo;s funding objectives and how they integrate with the plan&rsquo;s investment policy.</li>
    <li>Any funding risks faced by the plan and the plan&rsquo;s tolerance for volatility in funding requirements.</li>
    <li>Funding and contribution target levels, and cost-sharing arrangements (if any).</li>
    <li>A description of how any funding excesses will be utilized.</li>
    <li>Any guidance for the plan actuary in selecting actuarial methods and assumptions, and the frequency of actuarial valuations (subject to any legislative requirements).</li>
    <li>Responsibility for monitoring the funding policy.</li>
    <li>Communication regarding the funding policy with plan members.</li>
</ul>
<p>The Funding Policy Guideline also recognizes that different considerations may apply to multi-employer pension plans (MEPPs) &ndash; as compared to single employer plans &ndash; given that administrators of MEPPs have the option of altering benefit levels.</p>
<p><strong>Practical Implications</strong></p>
<p>While CAPSA guidelines do not have the force of law, plan administrators would be best advised to review their pension plan governance and investment structures with the requirements of the Investment and Funding Policy Guidelines in mind.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.pensionsbenefitslaw.com/2011/11/articles/plan-administration/capsa-guidelines-re-prudent-investments-and-funding-policies/</link>
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<category>Canada Pensions &amp; Benefits Law</category><category>DB Plan Funding</category><category>DC Plans</category><category>Investments</category><category>Plan Administration</category>
<pubDate>Wed, 16 Nov 2011 15:45:00 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Michel Benoit</dc:creator>

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<title>Le Ministère des Finances du Canada Publie Ses Propositions de Réforme des Régimes de Retraite</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>The following post is a French translation of Michel Benoit's October 27, 2009 post &quot;Pension Reform Proposals Released by Finance Canada&quot;.</p>
<p>Le ministre f&eacute;d&eacute;ral des finances Jim Flaherty a <a href="http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/09-103-fra.asp">publi&eacute; </a>une <a href="http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/data/09-103_1-fra.asp">s&eacute;rie de propositions en vue d&rsquo;am&eacute;liorer le cadre l&eacute;gislatif et r&egrave;glementaire des r&eacute;gimes de retraite priv&eacute;s assujettis &agrave; la juridiction f&eacute;d&eacute;rale.</a> Aucune indication n&rsquo;a &eacute;t&eacute; donn&eacute;e quant &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;ch&eacute;ancier d&rsquo;adoption des modifications requises &agrave; la <a href="http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fra/P-7.01/index.html">Loi de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension </a>(&laquo; LNPP &raquo;) et au <a href="http://laws.justice.gc.ca/fra/DORS-87-19/index.html">R&egrave;glement de 1985 sur les normes de prestation de pension </a>(&laquo; R&egrave;glement NPP &raquo;) pour mettre en &oelig;uvre ces propositions. Celles-ci semblent inclure un lot de mesures pour &laquo; contenter tout le monde &raquo;. Il n&rsquo;y a pas d&rsquo;indice dans le communiqu&eacute; de presse &agrave; l&rsquo;effet que le gouvernement ait l&rsquo;intention de solliciter le concours d&rsquo;intervenants &agrave; cette fin.</p>
<p>Le r&eacute;forme propos&eacute;e vise cinq objectifs:</p>
<p><strong>1.&nbsp; Rehausser la protection pour les participants</strong></p>
<ul>
    <li>Les promoteurs de r&eacute;gimes de retraite seront tenus de capitaliser enti&egrave;rement sur une p&eacute;riode de 5 ans les prestations de retraite &agrave; la terminaison du r&eacute;gime. Il est &agrave; noter que l&rsquo;obligation &agrave; l&rsquo;&eacute;gard de la capitalisation en cas de terminaison sera consid&eacute;r&eacute;e comme &eacute;tant une dette non garantie de la compagnie, c&rsquo;est-&agrave;-dire qu&rsquo;elle sera r&eacute;pertori&eacute;e dans la cat&eacute;gorie des cr&eacute;ances ordinaires en cas de faillite. Cette modification alignera ainsi la LNPP sur la l&eacute;gislation similaire de la plupart des autres juridictions canadiennes en mati&egrave;re de r&eacute;gimes de retraite.</li>
    <li>Les exon&eacute;rations de cotisations pour les promoteurs d&rsquo;un r&eacute;gime ne seront permises que si le r&eacute;gime affiche un exc&eacute;dent de capitalisation de 5 % ou plus.</li>
    <li>La bonification des prestations de retraite qui aurait pour effet de r&eacute;duire le ratio de solvabilit&eacute; d&rsquo;un r&eacute;gime &agrave; moins de 85 % ne sera pas permise et les promoteurs du r&eacute;gime devront produire annuellement une &eacute;valuation actuarielle.</li>
    <li>L&rsquo;&eacute;limination des cessations partielles d&eacute;clar&eacute;es par un employeur afin d&rsquo;assurer que les mises &agrave; pied, qu&rsquo;elles soient volontaires ou non, seront toutes trait&eacute;es de la m&ecirc;me mani&egrave;re.</li>
    <li>L&rsquo;acquisition des droits &agrave; prestation sera imm&eacute;diate d&egrave;s le d&eacute;but de la participation au r&eacute;gime. Toutefois, la p&eacute;riode d&rsquo;attente de 2 ans actuellement permise avant le d&eacute;but de la participation est maintenue.</li>
    <li>L&rsquo;exigence de fournir des informations dans les relev&eacute;s annuels de participants sera &eacute;tendue afin de permettre une meilleure compr&eacute;hension de la situation financi&egrave;re du r&eacute;gime par les participants.</li>
</ul>
<p><br />
<strong>2.&nbsp; R&eacute;duire l&rsquo;instabilit&eacute; de la capitalisation</strong></p>
<ul>
    <li>Une nouvelle norme de solvabilit&eacute; sera introduite afin de permettre aux promoteurs de r&eacute;gime, d&rsquo;utiliser les ratios de solvabilit&eacute; moyen du r&eacute;gime sur une p&eacute;riode de trois ans bas&eacute;s sur la valeur marchande des actifs du r&eacute;gime afin de d&eacute;terminer les montants requis pour capitaliser le r&eacute;gime. Les d&eacute;ficits pass&eacute;s seront consolid&eacute;s annuellement et la p&eacute;riode d&rsquo;amortissement du d&eacute;ficit de solvabilit&eacute; demeurera de cinq ans.</li>
    <li>L&rsquo;utilisation de lettres de cr&eacute;dit sera permise comme solution de rechange aux paiements de solvabilit&eacute; jusqu&rsquo;&agrave; concurrence d&rsquo;un maximum de 15 % des actifs du r&eacute;gime.</li>
    <li>Le seuil de 10 % de l&rsquo;exc&eacute;dent de la caisse pr&eacute;vu dans la Loi de l&rsquo;imp&ocirc;t sur le revenu sera hauss&eacute; &agrave; 25 % &agrave; compter de 2010 pour le co&ucirc;t des prestations pour services courants ce qui permettra aux employeurs d&rsquo;acquitter des contributions plus importantes. Il est &agrave; noter que ce nouveau seuil s&rsquo;appliquera &agrave; tous les r&eacute;gimes de retraite enregistr&eacute;s qu&rsquo;ils soient assujettis &agrave; la l&eacute;gislation f&eacute;d&eacute;rale ou provinciale.</li>
</ul>
<p><br />
<strong>3.&nbsp; R&eacute;solution de probl&egrave;mes propres au r&eacute;gime</strong></p>
<p>Un m&eacute;canisme sera disponible pour les promoteurs et les participants d&rsquo;un r&eacute;gime en cas d&rsquo;incapacit&eacute; des promoteurs de s&rsquo;acquitter des exigences de capitalisation. Ce m&eacute;canisme permettra aux promoteurs, participants et retrait&eacute;s d&rsquo;un r&eacute;gime de n&eacute;gocier un moratoire de courte dur&eacute;e sur les paiements de capitalisation. Toute entente ainsi n&eacute;goci&eacute;e sera sujette au consentement des participants et des retrait&eacute;s et &agrave; l&rsquo;approbation minist&eacute;rielle. Cette proposition d&eacute;riverait semble t il d&rsquo;une r&eacute;cente entente intervenue entre Air Canada, ses syndicats et ses retrait&eacute;s.</p>
<p><strong>4. Cadre am&eacute;lior&eacute; pour les r&eacute;gimes &agrave; prestations d&eacute;termin&eacute;es dont les cotisations sont d&eacute;termin&eacute;es ou n&eacute;goci&eacute;es</strong></p>
<p>La LNPP et le R&egrave;glement NPP, qui ne traitent pas actuellement de fa&ccedil;on ad&eacute;quate des r&eacute;gimes &agrave; cotisations d&eacute;termin&eacute;es (&laquo; CD &raquo;), seront modifi&eacute;s afin de clarifier les responsabilit&eacute;s et obligations applicables aux employeurs, participants, administrateurs et aux fournisseurs de produits d&rsquo;investissement de ces r&eacute;gimes. Les r&eacute;gimes CD pourront offrir aux participants l&rsquo;option de recevoir le paiement de leurs prestations de retraite sous forme de fonds de revenu viager (FRV) permettant ainsi aux participants de b&eacute;n&eacute;ficier des investissements faits par le r&eacute;gime de retraite plut&ocirc;t que d&rsquo;assumer personnellement la responsabilit&eacute; de la prise de d&eacute;cision en mati&egrave;re d&rsquo;investissement.</p>
<p><br />
Le cadre l&eacute;gislatif et r&egrave;glementaire des r&eacute;gimes &agrave; prestations d&eacute;termin&eacute;es et &agrave; cotisations n&eacute;goci&eacute;es sera am&eacute;lior&eacute; pour y clarifier les obligations de l&rsquo;employeur et d&rsquo;inclure express&eacute;ment le pouvoir du fiduciaire de r&eacute;duire les prestations accumul&eacute;es, sujet &agrave; l&rsquo;autorisation du surintendant, concernant la r&eacute;duction des prestations accumul&eacute;es.</p>
<p><strong>5. Modernisation des r&egrave;gles relatives aux placements</strong></p>
<p>Des changements longtemps souhait&eacute;s aux r&egrave;gles relatives aux placements sont propos&eacute;s, incluant le retrait des limites quantitatives en ce qui a trait aux investissements dans les ressources naturelles et l&rsquo;immobilier, &eacute;tablissant &agrave; cet &eacute;gard un maximum de 10 % de la valeur marchande des actifs du r&eacute;gime (plut&ocirc;t que leur valeur comptable) et interdisant les investissements directs dans des actions de l&rsquo;employeur ou sa dette.</p>
<p><strong>Autres mesures</strong></p>
<p>D&rsquo;autres modifications techniques sont propos&eacute;es en vue d&rsquo;am&eacute;liorer le cadre l&eacute;gislatif et r&egrave;glementaire de la LNPP et du R&egrave;glement NPP afin d&rsquo;aligner leurs dispositions en accord avec leur interpr&eacute;tation et les politiques courantes.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.pensionsbenefitslaw.com/2009/10/articles/another-category/le-ministare-des-finances-du-canada-publie-ses-propositions-de-raforme-des-ragimes-de-retraite/</link>
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<category>Canada Pensions &amp; Benefits Law</category><category>DB Plan Funding</category><category>DC Plans</category><category>Pension Reform</category><category>Plan Wind-Ups</category>
<pubDate>Thu, 29 Oct 2009 11:04:40 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Michel Benoit</dc:creator>

</item>
<item>
<title>Pension Reform Proposals Released By Finance Canada</title>
<description><![CDATA[<p>Finance Canada Minister Jim Flaherty <a href="http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/09-103-eng.asp">released</a>&nbsp;a <a href="http://www.fin.gc.ca/n08/data/09-103_1-eng.asp">series of proposals designed to improve the legislative and regulatory framework for federally regulated pension plans</a>. No indication was given as to the timing of the amendments to the <em><a href="http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/P-7.01/index.html">Pension Benefits Standards Act, 1985 </a></em>(PBSA) and the <em><a href="http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/P-7.01/SOR-87-19/index.html">Pension Benefits Standards Regulations, 1985 </a></em>(PBSA Regulations) that will be required to implement the proposals. The proposals contain a host of measures which appear to be designed to provide &ldquo;something for everyone&rdquo;. The press release does not mention any willingness on the part of the government to seek further input from stakeholders.</p>
<p>Five objectives are being pursued by the proposals.</p>
<p><strong>1.&nbsp; Enhanced Protection for Plan Members</strong></p>
<ul>
    <li>Plan sponsors will be required to fully fund pension benefits on plan termination over a 5 year period . It should be noted that the wind-up funding obligation will be considered an unsecured debt of the company, thus ranking on the same footing as any other unsecured creditor in the event of a bankruptcy. This change brings the PBSA into line with the requirements in most other Canadian pension jurisdictions.</li>
    <li>Contribution holidays by plan sponsors will not be permitted unless the plan has a solvency surplus of 5% or more.</li>
    <li>Benefit improvements which would reduce the solvency ratio of the plan to less than 85% will not be permitted and plan sponsors will be required to file annual actuarial valuations.</li>
    <li>Employer declared partial terminations will be eliminated thus ensuring that employment terminations, whether voluntary or not, will be treated the same way.</li>
    <li>Vesting of benefits will be immediate on commencement of plan participation. However, the 2 year waiting period currently allowed before participation begins will be maintained.</li>
    <li>Enhanced disclosure of information will be required to provide plan members with greater understanding of the plan&rsquo;s financial situation.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>2.&nbsp; Reduced Funding Volatility</strong></p>
<ul>
    <li>A new solvency standard will be introduced which will allow plan sponsors to measure their solvency funding requirements using the plan average solvency ratios over the last 3 years based on the market value of assets. Past deficiencies will be consolidated each year and the solvency deficit amortization period will remain at 5 years.</li>
    <li>Letters of credit will be permitted in lieu of actual solvency payments up to a maximum of 15 % of the plan&rsquo;s assets.</li>
    <li>The 10% surplus threshold under the Income Tax Act will be raised to 25% beginning with 2010 current service contributions thus allowing a greater amount of employer contributions to be made. It should be noted that the increased threshold should apply to all registered pension plans, whether federally or provincially regulated.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>3.&nbsp; Resolution of Plan-Specific Problems</strong></p>
<p>A framework will be available to sponsors and members of plans where the sponsor is unable to meet the statutory funding requirements. The framework will permit all stakeholders to agree to a &ldquo;workout scheme&rdquo; that would allow the company to benefit from a short moratorium on deficit payments and the members to agree to change the pension arrangements. Any such workout would be subject to member and retiree consent and Ministerial approval. It would appear that the recent arrangement arrived at between Air Canada and its unions and retirees is the source of this proposal.</p>
<p><strong>4.&nbsp;&nbsp;Enhanced Framework for Defined Contribution and Negotiated Contribution Defined Benefit Plans</strong></p>
<p>The PBSA and PBSA Regulations, which currently do not adequately address DC plans, will be amended to clarify the duties and responsibilities of sponsors, members, administrators and investment providers. DC plans will also be allowed to pay Life Income Fund-like retirement benefits, thus allowing plan members to benefit from the investments of the pension plan&nbsp;instead of having to personally assume investment decision-making responsibilities.</p>
<p>Negotiated Contribution Defined Benefit Plans will be subject to an improved framework, which will include greater clarity about employer contribution obligations, and explicit trustee authority to reduce accrued benefits subject to Superintendent authorization.</p>
<p><strong>5.&nbsp;&nbsp;Modernization of Investment Rules</strong></p>
<p>Much needed changes to the current investment rules are proposed including removing quantitative limits on resource and real property investments, determining the 10% concentration limit by measuring the plan&rsquo;s assets according to market value instead of book value, and prohibiting investments in employer shares or debt.</p>
<p><strong>Other Measures</strong></p>
<p>A number of technical housecleaning measures are also proposed&nbsp;to better align the PBSA and PBSA Regulations with current interpretation and policy.</p>]]></description>
<link>http://www.pensionsbenefitslaw.com/2009/10/articles/another-category/pension-reform-proposals-released-by-finance-canada/</link>
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<category>Canada Pensions &amp; Benefits Law</category><category>DB Plan Funding</category><category>DC Plans</category><category>Pension Reform</category><category>Plan Wind-Ups</category>
<pubDate>Tue, 27 Oct 2009 17:26:01 -0500</pubDate>
<dc:creator>Michel Benoit</dc:creator>

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